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The understanding of cooperative behavior in social systems has been the subject of intense research over the
past decades. In this regard, the theoretical models used to explain cooperation in human societies have been
complemented with a growing interest in experimental studies to validate the proposed mechanisms. In this
work, we rely on previous experimental findings to build a theoretical model based on two cooperation driving
mechanisms: second-order reputation and memory. Specifically, taking the Donation Game as a starting point,
the agents are distributed among three strategies, namely Unconditional Cooperators, Unconditional Defectors,
and Discriminators, where the latter follow a second-order assessment rule: Shunning, Stern Judging, Image
Scoring, or Simple Standing. A discriminator will cooperate if the evaluation of the recipient’s last actions
contained in his memory is above a threshold of (in)tolerance. In addition to the dynamics inherent to the game,
another imitation dynamics, involving much longer times (generations), is introduced. The model is approached
through a mean-field approximation that predicts the macroscopic behavior observed in Monte Carlo simula-
tions. We found that, while in most second-order assessment rules, intolerance hinders cooperation, it has the
opposite (positive) effect under the Simple Standing rule. Furthermore, we show that, when considering mem-
ory, the Stern Judging rule shows the lowest values of cooperation, while stricter rules show higher cooperation
levels.
I. INTRODUCTION
The presence of cooperative behavior among unrelated in-
dividuals remains an open question in the scientific commu-
nity, constituting one of the current key scientific challenges1.
The Evolutionary Game Theory2,3 provides a powerful frame-
work to study cooperative behavior4, including cooperation
in structured populations5–8. Several mechanisms have been
proposed to explain cooperation9, such as kin selection10,
direct11 or indirect reciprocity12, group selection13, and net-
work reciprocity14–17. Among them, indirect reciprocity does
not require repeated interactions between the same pair of
partners and offers a clear explanation of how this preference
for cooperation has evolved18,19. In a population, when an in-
dividual exhibits an altruistic behavior towards another one,
he pays a cost –including time, energy or risks– for his help-
ing action even if he cannot get immediate returns. However,
if a third party knows of his kind deed, he may provide help
to this altruist in a later action so that the original cost of the
first agent can be counteracted to obtain the positive benefit.
That is, the helper receives the benefit not from the benefi-
ciary himself but another individual. Indirect reciprocity re-
quires public information about individual actions, as well as
an evaluation system, so that cooperation can be sustained for
a long time20–22. Thus, it is significant to build a feasible and
reliable evaluation system23 to differentiate between altruis-
tic and selfish persons, and give the corresponding reward24,25
for the contributor or punishment26–28 to the cheater.
Regarding the individual actions evaluation, probably the
most popular approach is the Image Scoring, proposed by
Nowak and Sigmund to explore the role of indirect reciprocity
in the evolution of cooperation through computer simulations
and theoretical analyses12,29. They showed that cooperation
can thrive via the indirect reciprocity if each agent holds an
image score, being the score increased (resp., decreased) by
one point for each act of helping (not helping). According to
this approach, a donor will provide help to a recipient if, and
only if, this recipient has a positive score. Therefore, a player
will obtain the help from others in the future if he has helped
more often than he has refused to do it.
However, there is no unanimity on the effectiveness of
the Image Scoring rule. As an example, Leimar and
Hammerstein30 indicated theoretically that Sugden’s Stand-
ing Strategy31 provided a much more effective mechanism to
foster cooperation through indirect reciprocity under a more
complex population structure. In Sugden’s Standing Model31,
a player’s score only decreases when he refuses to help a re-
cipient with a good score. Unlike Image Scoring, defecting
against a bad guy does not penalize the donor’s reputation.
After that, Panchanathan and Boyd32 also explored the evolu-
tion of indirect reciprocity when errors are considered, show-
ing that, under these circumstances, Image Scoring is not an
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), while the Standing Strat-
egy can be. Henceforth, only considering the actor’s action
(usually termed as the first-order evaluation) is not always
enough when we design the rule of reputation evaluation, it
is necessary to take both the donor’s action and the recipient’s
reputation into account, which is referred to as a second-order
assessment rule.
As a further step, Ohtsuki and Iwasa20,33exhaustively dis-
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2cussed the aforementioned two rules, together with other
second-order reputation evaluation schemes, and found that
Standing Strategy is often more successful than Image Scor-
ing. In particular, they further pointed out that only eight
cases, called “leading eight”, significantly facilitate indirect
reciprocity. At the same time, extensive experiments34,35
are also conducted to illustrate how the Standing or Scoring
mechanisms are adopted in the human cooperation, and it is
indicated that the Standing rule is not superior to the Scor-
ing mechanism due to the imperfect information36 or gossip37
dissemination during the real experiments.
A non-negligible fact is that, with some exceptions30, most
theoretical works assume the well-mixed structure to study
the reputation evaluation. Recently, Sasaki et al.38 investi-
gated the evolution of reputation-based cooperation in a reg-
ular lattice considering four leading second-order assessment
rules (these rules will be defined and discussed in section II B).
Through an agent-based model, they showed that those four
rules lead to distinct cooperative behaviors, which strongly
depends on the setup, and it is particularly indicated that the
Simple Standing strategy is the most efficient one in terms of
the promotion of cooperation on regular ring networks.
It is worth noting that the above-mentioned theoretical
models carry out the second-order reputation assessment just
according to the last action of a donor and the standing status
of a recipient, that is, the historical information on individual
actions in those studies reduces to one step. Nevertheless, the
historical information (i.e., memory effect) may play a role
in decision-making. For instance, Wang et al.39 presented a
memory-based Snowdrift Game on top of regular lattices and
scale-free networks, where the fraction of cooperating actions
stored in the memory is used to determine the strategy adop-
tion at the next generation, finding that the memory length of
individuals plays a distinct role as the cost-to-benefit ratio is
changed. In a recent work, Cuesta et al.40 showed through ex-
periments with memory effect that reputation fosters cooper-
ation and drives network formation. Furthermore, they found
that people measure reputation based on all the information
available (memory length), giving more weight to the last ac-
tion. Thus, it is essential to combine the second-order assess-
ment information with the memory effect to further study the
role of indirect reciprocity in the evolution of cooperation, and
we try to fill this gap in the current work.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, in Sec-
tion II, we introduce the Donation Game Model with Memory
and Second-Order Assessment. Secondly, in section III, we
address the model through a mean-field approximation that,
while omitting some key features, helps its understanding and
qualitatively predicts the macroscopic behavior observed in
section IV, where we provide the results of large numerical
simulations. Finally, in section V we discuss the implications
of the model, together with the conclusions.
II. DONATION GAMEMODELWITH MEMORY AND
SECOND-ORDER ASSESSMENT
In this paper, we investigate the Evolutionary Donation
Game in a finite size population, as formulated in most spa-
tial indirect reciprocity models18. During each interaction, ev-
ery actor (individual) has just one chance to play as a donor,
i.e., donate or not to a recipient, which is chosen within his
neighborhood. Furthermore, individual actions history will
be considered as a basis of reputation assessment40, according
to four typical second-order strategies20,33 below described in
section II B. Hence, the memory effect or history of the re-
cent actions will be combined with the reputation-based as-
sessment rule to analyze the evolution of cooperation within a
structured population. In what follows, we will describe in de-
tail the newly proposed Donation Game Model with Memory
and Second-Order Assessment.
A. Donation Game
In the proposed model, the interaction between any pair of
players can be described as a Donation Game, that is, one
player is selected as a donor and the other one as a recipient,
and subsequently the donor will decide whether he will make
a donation to the recipient or not. If he donates, the donor
will pay a cost c, and the recipient will obtain a benefit b (b >
c); if not, the donor will pay nothing, and the recipient will
not receive any benefit. Although the donation does not give
any direct benefit to donors, some individuals may choose to
donate to show a good image and then increase their chances
to get help from others in the future. Thus, the Donation Game
is often chosen as a basic framework to explore the role of
indirect reciprocity.
B. Second-order Assessment Rules
How to judge the goodness of a recipient is crucial for the
here proposed model, and we select four typical second-order
assessment rules as the basis of the calculation of the recipient
score33. In Tab. I, we depict the assessment results under these
four rules including Shunning, Stern Judging, Image Scoring
and Simple Standing. We summarize their main features as
follows:
• Shunning: The donor is positively evaluated when he
cooperates (donates) against a cooperator. Otherwise
(when he cooperates against a defector or whenever he
defects), he will be negatively evaluated. This is the
strictest rule to obtain a good image.
• Stern Judging: The donor will be positively evaluated
if he cooperates against a cooperator, or if he defects
(rejects the donation) against a defector. Otherwise, he
will be negatively evaluated. To a certain extent, this
rule will justify the defection since rejecting the dona-
tion to a recipient with a bad image is not considered a
bad action, which helps a bad recipient to cleanse his
3image by refusing to help another player with a bad im-
age.
• Image Scoring: The donor will be positively evaluated
if he cooperates or negatively evaluated if he defects,
regardless of the recipient’s past actions. In essence,
this is a first-order rule since the image of an agent is
uniquely determined by his own action.
• Simple Standing: The donor will be negatively eval-
uated only if defects against a cooperator. Otherwise
(when he defects against a defector or whenever he co-
operates), he will be positively evaluated. Henceforth,
the Simple Standing rule is the most tolerant rule for
a donor to get a good evaluation among the four rules
considered here.
For all these rules, when facing cooperator, a player will
be positively evaluated if he cooperates, and negatively if he
defects. The differences between these four rules appear when
the donor meets a defector.
Recipient’s Image C C D D
Donor’s Strategy C D C D
Shunning G B B B
Stern Judging G B B G
Image Scoring G B G B
Simple Standing G B G G
TABLE I. Representative second-order reputation assessment rules.
In the second row, C and D (i.e., cooperation and defection) designate
the action of the donor facing a recipient whose previous action is
displayed in the first row. From third to sixth rows, G/B denotes
that the donor will be evaluated as good (G) or bad (B) after the
corresponding actions.
C. Initial Conditions
Let us consider a regular grid lattice of size L (the total
number of players is N = L×L), which satisfies the periodic
boundary conditions, and each node of the lattice will be occu-
pied by a player who has 8 nearest neighbors (i.e., we consider
the Moore neighborhood). Initially, each player will be ran-
domly assigned equiprobably to one of three possible strate-
gies: Cooperator (ALLC), Defector (ALLD) or Discriminator
(DISC), which can be described in detail as follows:
• ALLC: the donor always cooperates, that is, ALLC
strategists are unconditional cooperators.
• ALLD: the donor defects under any scenario. ALLD
strategists are unconditional defectors.
• DISC: the decision of whether to cooperate or not de-
pends on the estimated reputation score of the recipient,
which in turn is based i) on the last recipient’s actions
and ii) on the donor’s assessment rule. We term these
strategists as discriminators; the assessment rules have
been described in previous Section II B.
Players, as donors, are characterized by four possible ac-
tions: CC, CD, DC, DD. Two of these actions, CC and CD,
correspond to cooperative actions, namely, CC when coop-
erating against a cooperator (i.e., the recipient cooperated in
his last action) and CD when cooperating against a defector
(recipient’s last action was to defect). The other two actions,
DC and DD, correspond to non-cooperative actions: DC if
a player defects against a cooperator and DD if he defects
against a defector. In order to characterize the memory effect
of individuals in the current model, we will record the action
lists for each individual in the most recent M steps40.
Regarding the initial conditions, first M actions of ALLC
(resp., ALLD) strategists are randomly chosen from CC or
CD (resp., DC or DD), while first M actions of DISC strate-
gists are randomly taken from the set {CC, CD, DC, DD} and
determined by the specific assessment rule of the discrimina-
tor (Section II B).
D. Iteration Procedure
The evolution of the game will be hinged in the following
way: at each elementary time step, a random player (the focal
player or donor) chooses a random neighbor (the recipient)
and decides if he cooperates or not. At each period, any player
will have, on average, one chance to act as a donor, that is, a
period consists of N elementary time steps (Donation Game
decisions) that will take part in random order.
Let us explain in detail the dynamical procedure:
• ALLC: if the focal Player-i is an unconditional coop-
erator, he pays the cost c to Player- j who obtains the
benefit b (i and j payoffs are −c and b, respectively).
We record i’s last action as CC if Player- j’s last action
was CC or CD; otherwise, the last action of Player-i is
recorded as CD.
• ALLD: if the focal Player-i is an unconditional defec-
tor, he rejects the donation to his partner j, and both
payoffs are zero. We record i’s last action as DC if
Player- j’s last action was CC or CD; otherwise, the last
action of Player-i is recorded as DD.
• DISC: if the focal Player-i is a discriminator, he will
calculate the weighted image score of Player- j in the
light of four different assessment rules as shown in Tab.
I. If Player- j’s score is higher than the required mini-
mum reputation H0, Player-i will donate to j; otherwise,
Player-i will reject the donation. H0 represents a min-
imum threshold so that the recipient can be considered
good enough to be a beneficiary of the donation. It is,
therefore, a measure of the intolerance. Finally, Player-
i’s last action will be accordingly updated. The detailed
decision procedure for DISC players can be further de-
scribed as follows:
41): Assessment.Player-i will evaluate Player- j’s ac-
tions to be good (G) or bad (B) according to Tab.
I. As an example, we assume that Player-i is a dis-
criminator adopting the Stern Judging rule, and
the last M = 5 actions of Player- j are CC, DC, CD,
DD, CC. Then, based on Tab. I, Player-i judges
Player- j’s goodness of action list to be G, B, B,
G, G.
2): Calculation of the weighted score. If the action is
judged as good (G) or bad (B), the corresponding
score will be 1 or 0, respectively. The final reputa-
tion score of Player- j through the eyes of Player-i
will be defined as:
r j|i = w∗S+(1−w)∗ S¯ , (1)
where S denotes the score of j’s last action
and S¯ represents the average score of j’s M
last actions48. In the above-mentioned example,
Player- j’s score will be: r j|i = w ∗ 1 + (1−w) ∗
1+0+0+1+1
5 = w+(1−w)(3/5).
3): Decision. If r j|i > H0, Player-i will pay the cost c to
cooperate with Player- j, who will obtain the ben-
efit b. Otherwise, Player-i will defect, and both
payoffs will be zero. We will record Player-i last
action accordingly.
A generation includes h of the above described periods. At
the end of a generation, all the players synchronously up-
date their current strategies following a Fermi-like updating
rule41–43. Let Pi and Pj be the payoffs of player i and a ran-
dom neighbor j, accumulated throughout the last generation.
Then, Player-i will imitate Player- j’s strategy with a probabil-
ity Prob(i← j) given by:
Prob(i← j) = 1
1+ e(Pi−Pj)/K
, (2)
where K denotes the irrationality of individual choice or the
noise of strategy adoption.
Note that the model includes two different time scales:
a time scale involving payoff-independent decision-making
strategies17,47, and another longer scale, of evolutionary char-
acter, involving strategies imitation41.
III. MEAN-FIELD APPROXIMATION.
In this Section, we discuss various approaches to obtain a
mean-field solution to the model here presented. These ap-
proaches preserve the assessment rules based on the second-
order reputation while neglecting some aspects related to the
spacial distribution and formation of clusters, the length of
the memory and the weight of the last action. The goal of this
mean-field approximation is to capture the qualitative behav-
ior of the system and detect which specific aspects are not re-
produced due to the ingredients not considered here. Through-
out this section, we will refer to figures 1 and 2 (which contain
the numerical results that will be developed in Section IV) to
have a visual reference of the parameter space and, also, to
compare the predictions with the agent-based numerical re-
sults.
Consider a well-mixed population and the low noise case
(K hb), which allows us to assume a deterministic imitation
rule. Let ρc, ρd , and ρi be the fraction of ALLC, ALLD, and
DISC strategists, respectively. For simplicity, let us consider
an initial population defined by ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3.
A. Image Scoring
Here, we study the case when DISCs are Image Scoring
strategists. Discriminators always donate to ALLC, but never
to ALLD players. Let 〈ri|i〉 be the mean value of the reputation
score of a DISC as seen by another DISC. From Eq. (1) and
Table I, it follows:
〈ri|i〉= w〈C〉+(1−w)〈C〉= 〈C〉, (3)
where 〈C〉 is the fraction of cooperative actions in the system.
Note that w influences the variance of ri|i but not its mean
value. On average, a DISC will give to another DISC if
〈ri|i〉> H0.
The average payoffs for ALLC, ALLD, and DISC strate-
gists are, respectively:
Πc = (ρc +ρi)b− c
Πd = ρcb
Πi = (ρc +ρiΘ(〈ri|i〉−H0))(b− c)
= (ρc +ρiΘ(〈C〉−H0))(b− c),
(4)
where Θ stands for the Heaviside function which is zero for
negative arguments and one for positive ones.
Low H0
For low enough values of H0 (i.e., H0 < 〈C〉), DISC play-
ers, on average, will cooperate when facing another DISC.
The average cooperation level within a generation (constant
ρc,ρd ,ρi) evolves according to:
〈C〉& ρc +ρi〈C〉 → 〈C〉& ρc1−ρi . (5)
Within the first generation, given ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3, 〈C〉
evolves to a value greater than 1/2. When H0 < 〈C〉, what is
true for H0 . 0.5, the average payoff of a DISC is given by:
Πi = (ρc +ρi)(b− c), (6)
5and the average payoff difference between DISC and ALLD
is:
Πi−Πd = (ρc +ρi)(b− c)−ρcb, (7)
what implies that Πi > Πd if ρib > (ρc +ρi)c. At the end of
the first generation, this condition will be satisfied for b > 2c.
For b > 2c, DISC will overcome both ALLD and ALLC,
while ALLD will overcome ALLC. If 〈C〉 increases over time,
condition H0 < 〈C〉 is preserved, and therefore Eq. (6). Fur-
thermore, as ρi increases over time, Πi−Πd increases. So,
we can conclude that, for H0 . 0.5, DISC will invade ALLD
if b > 2c.
Regarding the resilience of ALLC strategists, on the one
hand the average payoff difference between ALLC and ALLD
is given by:
Πc−Πd = ρib− c, (8)
what implies that Πc > Πd if ρib > c. For the initial strate-
gists distribution (ρi = 1/3), ALLC defeats ALLD for b > 3c.
On the other hand, the payoff difference between DISC and
ALLC is:
Πi−Πc = cρd , (9)
that is, Πi > Πc if ρd > 0, Πi = Πc otherwise. Actually, in
absence of ALLD players, ALLC and DISC are indistinguish-
able strategists.
Summarizing, regarding panels (III) in Fig. 2, where c = 1:
• Upper left area. Provided b > 3, the higher the value
of b, the higher the fraction of ALLC that will survive
the first stages and will coexist with DISC players at the
steady state.
• For 3 > b > 2, DISC will invade ALLC and ALLD.
• Bottom left corner. For b < 2, we have Πd −Πi = ρc,
and ALLD will invade ALLC and DISC.
High H0
For high values of H0 (i.e., H0 < 〈C〉), the average coop-
eration level within a generation (constant ρc,ρd ,ρi) evolves
according to:
〈C〉. ρc +ρi〈C〉 → 〈C〉. ρc1−ρi . (10)
Within the first generation (ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3), 〈C〉
evolves to a value lower than 1/2. When H0 > 0.5, the av-
erage payoff of a DISC is given by:
Πi = ρc(b− c), (11)
and, therefore:
Πc−Πi = ρdc+ρi(b− c),
Πd−Πi = ρcc.
(12)
For high enough values of b, both ALLC and ALLD will
defeat DISC. Taking into account:
Πd−Πc = c−ρib (13)
the advantage of the ALLD over the ALLC increases as ρi
decreases, which in turn leads to a reduction in ρc and to
an absorving mono-strategic state of ALLD (Upper-right and
central-right area of panels (III) in Fig. 2).
As b decreases, the average payoff difference between
ALLC and DISC (i.e., ρib− (ρi−ρd)c) decreases. Note that,
in absence of ALLC, DISC strategists never donate, therefore
ALLD and DISC are indistinguishable strategists: if some
DISC strategists survive the first stages sorrounded by DISC
and ALLD, they will coexist (as defectors) with ALLD, allow-
ing a mixed equilibrium of ALLD and DISC (Bottom-right
area of panels (III) in Fig. 2). Note that, in any case, the only
action will be to defect (right area of panel (c) in Fig. 1).
B. Shunning
In this subsection, we analize the case when DISCs are
Shunning strategists. In this case, discriminators never donate
to ALLD. On the other hand, ALLC always cooperate, but
only when cooperating with a cooperator will be positively
evaluated by DISC.
The mean reputation scores of ALLC, ALLD, and DISC
players through the eyes of a DISC are, respectively:
〈rc|i〉= 〈C〉,
〈rd|i〉= 0,
〈ri|i〉= 〈C〉2.
(14)
Low H0
For low relative values of H0 (i.e., H0 < 〈C〉), DISC players,
on average, will pay to ALLC. The average cooperation level
within a generation (constant ρc,ρd ,ρi) evolves according to:
〈C〉& ρc +ρi〈C〉2 → 〈C〉& 1−
√
1−4ρcρi
2ρi
. (15)
In the first generation (ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3), 〈C〉 evolves to a
value greater than ∼ 0.38. When H0 < 〈C〉2, what is true in
the early stages for H0 . 0.15, the average payoffs are given
by:
Πc = (ρc +ρi)b− c,
Πd = ρcb,
Πi = (ρc +ρi)(b− c)
(16)
6which are the same payoffs that those of Eq. (4,6) correspond-
ing to the previous Image Scoring - Low H0 case, and there-
fore, the same analysis applies here. Note that, although pay-
offs in Eq. (16) were calculated for the first generation, 〈C〉
increases over time, and therefore also the payoffs differences.
A consequence is the similarity between the left part of the re-
spective panels (I) and (III) in Fig. 2, and between panels (a)
and (c) in Fig. 1. Nevertheless, given the fact that the con-
dition of low H0 is more restrictive in the current case, the
cooperative green area on the right side of panel (a) in Fig. 1
is smaller than that in panel (c).
High H0
For high values of H0 (i.e., H0 > 〈C〉), DISC players, on av-
erage, will not donate to ALLC. The cooperation level within
a generation evolves according to:
〈C〉. ρc +ρi〈C〉2 → 〈C〉. 1−
√
1−4ρcρi
2ρi
. (17)
Therefore, the condition H0 > 〈ri|i〉 = 〈C〉2 is satisfied at
the end of the first generation (ρc = ρi = 1/3, 〈C〉 . 0.38).
It follows that DISC players, on average, will not donate to
anybody. The payoffs are given by:
Πc = ρcb− c,
Πd = Πi = ρcb. (18)
For high values of H0, DISC will play as ALLD, both having
a higher payoff than ALLC.
Payoffs in (18) were calculated for the first generation.
Nevertheless, 〈C〉 decreases over time as DISC and ALLD
overcome ALLC, and therefore 〈ri|i〉 decreases according to
(14). This means that the order of the payoffs is preserved over
time: ALLD and DISC will invade ALLC. Although there is
a mixed equilibrium composed of DISC and ALLD strategists
(right side of panels (I) in Fig. 2), the former will act as de-
fectors, and therefore the cooperative level will tend to zero
(right side of panel (a) in Fig. 1).
Since in this case Πd =Πi, higher-order effects beyond the
mean-field approach should play a key role. Although for
H0 > 〈C〉, DISC players, on average, will not donate to any
strategist, there is an ε > 0 probablity for a DISC to pay to
an ALLC (and an even smaller probability to pay to another
DISC). By adding this corrective term, the average DISC pay-
off becomes:
Πi = ρcb− ερcc = ρc(b− εc). (19)
The lower the value of H0 (also the shorter the memory length
M), the higher the value of ε . Furthermore, the relative payoff
difference between ALLD and DISC will decrease as b in-
creases. To summarize, although according to the mean-field
approximation ALLD and DISC payoffs are equal, higher-
order effects imply a dependence of the final mixed equilib-
rium on b and H0.
C. Stern Judging
Here, we investigate the case when DISCs are Stern Judg-
ing strategists. Depending on the values of the parameters,
DISC players may donate or not both to ALLC and ALLD
players. The mean reputation scores of the different strategist,
as seen by a DISC, are given by:
〈rc|i〉= 〈C〉,
〈rd|i〉= 1−〈C〉,
〈ri|i〉= 〈C〉2 +(1−〈C〉)2.
(20)
Low H0
From (20) it follows that, provided H0 < 〈C〉 and H0 <
(1−〈C〉), DISC players, on average, will pay to ALLC and
ALLD. At the first generation (ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3), on av-
erage, half of the actions of a DISC will be considered as
good actions by another DISC. The average cooperation level
within a generation (constant ρc,ρd ,ρi) evolves according to:
〈C〉& ρc +ρi〈C〉2 +ρi(1−〈C〉)2→
〈C〉&
2ρi +1−
√
1−4ρ2i −8ρcρi +4ρi
4ρi
(21)
Therefore, for (ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3), it follows 〈ri|i〉& 1/2.
The corresponding average payoffs for H0 < 1/3 will be:
Πc = Πi = (ρc +ρi)b− c,
Πd = (ρc +ρi)b.
(22)
At the end of the first generation, ALLD players overcome
ALLC and DISC and 〈C〉 decreases. Therefore, according to
(20), 〈rc|i〉 decreases and 〈rd|i〉 increases over time. In the
same way, 〈ri|i〉 tends to ρd +ρi as 〈C〉 decreases, and there-
fore to 1 as ρc decreases. Consequently, payoffs evolve over
time towards:
Πc = ρcb− c,
Πd = (ρc +ρi)b,
Πi = (ρc +ρi)b− c,
(23)
and ALLD strategy will invade ALLC and DISC (left area of
panels (II) in Fig. 2).
Mean-field approximation cannot reproduce the coopera-
tive behavior observed in the numerical simulations for high
7values of b, when payoff differences are small and other high-
order effects become key. As in the previous case, there are
two equal payoffs in (23), here Πc =Πi. By adding a higher-
order corrective term, the average DISC payoff for the first
stages becomes:
Πi = (ρc +ρi)b− (1− ε)c.
Note that, unlike the previous case (Shunning, high H0), the
corrective term now applies to the probability of a DISC to de-
fect against any strategist (i.e., it is not multiplied by a density
ρ), becoming higher than that for Shunning discriminators.
The relative payoff difference between ALLD and the rest of
the players will decrease as b increases. For high values of b,
the differences between the payoffs cannot prevent the forma-
tion of cooperative clusters. Note that this cooperative behav-
ior (upper left corner of panel (b) in Fig. 1) corresponds to
DISC strategist that act as cooperators.
High H0
For high relative values of H0 (i.e., H0 > 〈C〉 and H0 >
(1−〈C〉), DISC players, on average, will pay neither ALLC
nor ALLD. As in the previous case (low H0), at the first gener-
ation (ρc = ρd = ρi = 1/3), on average, half of the actions of
a DISC will be considered as good actions by another DISC.
The average cooperation level within a generation evolves ac-
cording to:
〈C〉. ρc +ρi〈C〉2 +ρi(1−〈C〉)2→
〈C〉.
2ρi +1−
√
1−4ρ2i −8ρcρi +4ρi
4ρi
(24)
Solving it for ρc = ρi = 1/3, it is found that for H0 > 1/2,
a DISC will probably defect when facing any strategist. Re-
garding higher order effects, the shorter the memory length
M, the higher the probability ε for a DISC to cooperate.
At the end of the first generation, the corresponding average
payoffs will be:
Πc = ρcb− c,
Πd = ρcb,
Πi = ρcb− εc.
(25)
where, the higher-order corrective term ε has been added
(Πi = Πd in the mean-field). Given Πd > Πi > Πc, ALLD
players will beat ALLC and DISC. According to (20), the con-
sequent decrease of 〈C〉 leads to an increase in 〈rd|i〉 and 〈ri|i〉,
and to a decrease in 〈rc|i〉.
Consequently, payoffs evolve over time towards:
Πc = ρcb− c,
Πd = (ρc +ρi)b,
Πi = (ρc +ρi)b− c,
(26)
and ALLD strategy will invade ALLC and DISC, bringing the
system to a mono-strategic ALLD state (right area of panels
(II) in Fig. 2).
D. Simple Standing
In this subsection we discuss the case when DISC are
Simple Standing strategists. In this case, discriminators
always cooperate when facing an ALLC. Regarding ALLD
strategists, an ALLD defecting against a defector will be
positively evaluated by a DISC. The mean value of the
reputation scores through the eyes of a DISC are:
〈rc|i〉= 1,
〈rd|i〉= 1−〈C〉,
〈ri|i〉= 〈C〉+(1−〈C〉)2.
(27)
On average, a DISC will give to an ALLD if
〈rd|i〉= 1−〈C〉> H0. Regarding how a DISC evaluates
another DISC, note that the function 〈ri|i〉(〈C〉) is not
monotonous, reaching a minimun value for 〈C〉= 1/2.
For low relative values of H0 (i.e., H0 < 1− 〈C〉), DISC
players, on average, will pay to ALLD. Within a generation,
the average cooperation evolves according to:
〈C〉& ρc +ρi(〈C〉+(1−〈C〉)2). (28)
Solving (28) for ρc = ρi = 1/3, it is found that 〈C〉 evolves
towards 〈C〉& 0.59 within the first generation. It follows that,
at the end of the first generation, DISC will pay to all the
strategists for H . 0.41. The corresponding average payoffs
are given by:
Πc = Πi = (ρc +ρi)b− c,
Πd = (ρc +ρi)b.
(29)
Therefore, ALLD players will overcome ALLC and DISC.
As ρd and (1−〈C〉) increase over time, ri|i increases, and the
system will evolve in time towards 〈rc|i〉 = 〈rd|i〉 = 〈ri|i〉 = 1,
with DISC playing as ALLC. The system is characterized by a
fraction ρc +ρd of cooperators and a fraction ρd of defectors.
This is the classical scenario where mean-field approach in-
volves full defection (ALLD) and cannot explain cooperation
8for high enough values of b in structured populations (and also
with memory in this model).
As H0 increases, the probablity for a DISC to pay to an
ALLD decreases. For H0 > 1−〈C〉, DISC players, on aver-
age, will not donate to ALLD. Approximation (28) becomes:
〈C〉. ρc +ρi(〈C〉+(1−〈C〉)2). (30)
Solving (30) for ρc = ρi = 1/3, it is found that within the
first generation the cooperation will tend to 〈C〉 →∼ 0.59. At
the end of the first generation, for H0 & 0.41, and the average
payoffs can be approximated by:
Πc = (ρc +ρi)b− c,
Πd = ρcb.
Πi = (ρc +ρi)(b− c),
(31)
and the average payoff difference between DISC and ALLD
will be:
Πi−Πd = (ρc +ρi)(b− c)−ρcb = ρib− (ρc +ρi)c. (32)
In the first stages (ρc = ρi), DISC players will overcome
ALLC and ALLD for b > 2c. Nevertheless, the consequent
increase of ρi and 〈C〉 over time leads to a decrease in 〈ri|i〉
and to an increase in 〈rd|i〉. This fact involves a trade-off be-
tween b and H0: a lower value of H0 involves a higher b to
allow DISC invading ALLD (column (IV) in Fig. 2).
Regarding ALLC strategists, the average payoffs differ-
ences are given by:
Πc−Πd = ρib− c,
Πi−Πc = cρd ,
(33)
what implies that Πc > Πd for ρib > c. At the first stages
(ρi = 1/3), ALLC defeats ALLD for b > 3c. Furthermore,
Πi > Πc if ρd > 0, otherwise Πi = Πc. Actually, for ρd = 0,
ALLC and DISC are indistinguishable strategists. Provided
b ≥ 3, the higher the value of b, the higher the fraction of
ALLC players that will survive the first stages and will coexist
with DISC ones at the steady state (panels (d1,d3) in Fig. 2).
IV. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we present and discuss the results of nu-
merical simulations for the agent-based model proposed here.
We reduce the payoffs matrix parameters by fixing c = 1 and
focus on the impact of recipient’s benefit b and intolerance
threshold H0 on the cooperative behavior under the different
second-order assessment rules considered. Based on previous
experiments40, we fix the additional weight of the last action
to w = 0.165 and the memory length to M = 5. Each indepen-
dent realization is run up to 2000 generations, ensuring that
the system can reach a steady state, which is reached typically
after 100-1000 generations. Fig. 1-5, which will be discussed
in the following subsections, display the results corresponding
to N = 2500 (L = 50). Additionally, larger lattice sizes (e.g.,
N = 104) are also tested and qualitatively equivalent results
have been obtained (not shown here for brevity).
FIG. 1. Fraction of cooperating actions 〈C〉 in the stationary state as
a function of the benefit b and intolerance H, for Shunning (panel
a), Stern Judging (b), Image Scoring (c), and Simple Standing (d)
assessments rules. All results are averaged over 20 independent runs.
Other parameters are N = 2500, c = 1, w = 0.165, h = 50, M = 5,
and K = 1.
A. Level of cooperation and strategies distribution
Fig. 1 displays the stationary fraction of cooperative ac-
tions 〈C〉 as a function of the benefit b and intolerance H0,
each panel corresponding to each one of the four assessment
rules considered: Shunning (panel a), Stern Judging (b), Im-
age Scoring (c) and Simple Standing (d). In general, a very
low recipient’s benefit (b ∼ 1) does not encourage the donor
to donate. For higher values of b, the level of cooperation de-
pends on the benefit b and intolerance H0 in different ways
for different assessment rules. As shown, a low intolerance
H0 promotes cooperation for Image Scoring and Shunning
rules while, conversely, Simple Standing rule behaves better
for high values of H0. Finally, Stern Judging rule is the least
favorable for cooperation since it only allows cooperative ac-
tions for very high benefit b and low intolerance H0. This last
result differs from previous studies20,33 where neither memory
nor intolerance was considered.
To further study the differences in the cooperation level for
the different assessment rules, Figure 2 shows the distribu-
tion of the different strategies –ALLC, ALLD, and DISC– as
a function of b and H0. From left to right, each column cor-
responds to one of the four assessment rules: Shunning (col-
umn I), Stern Judging (II), Image Scoring (III) and Simple
Standing (IV). Additionally, for each column, the fraction of
each strategy at the stationary state is shown in different rows:
ALLC (panels in top row), ALLD (center), and DISC (bot-
tom). Generally speaking, under one specific assessment rule,
the level of cooperation is determined by the competition be-
tween ALLD, DISC, and ALLC strategists.The coexistence
of these three strategies is difficult, showing (simplex) inner
points only for very specific regions of the parameter space.
The distribution of strategies can help explain cooperative
behavior for the different rules. Note that the arguments used
9here, although from a qualitative nature, include more ingre-
dients than those used in the previous mean-field approxima-
tion, such as memory and spatial distribution, and the results
exhibit some new non-trivial phenomena as follows:
• Shunning: Here, DISC players will only positively
evaluate CC actions and therefore do not cooperate
against ALLD players. For a low intolerance threshold
H0, given an initial homogeneous strategy distribution
(ρc ∼ ρd ∼ ρi), and a large enough memory (in plots,
M = 5), DISC and ALLC players will have, on aver-
age, a fraction µS of CC actions in their memory such
that µS > H0, and therefore will be positively evalu-
ated by DISC players. Thus, DISCs will likely coop-
erate when facing DISC and ALLC players. As ALLC
strategists will cooperate against any strategist, ALLC
and DISC players can group and form cooperative clus-
ters for high enough b, invading ALLD players (who
only receive donations from ALLC players). Without
ALLD players, ALLC and DISC are equivalent strate-
gies and will coexist as cooperators. On the other hand,
for high values of intolerance H0, a small fraction of ac-
tions belonging to the set {DC,CD,DD} (any strategist
is compatible with one or more actions in that set and
will be likely present in his history at the early stages)
is enough to be negatively evaluated by other DISC
players, that is, any strategist will have, on average, a
fraction µS of CC or actions in his memory such that
µS < H0, and therefore will be negatively evaluated by
DISC players. Thus, DISC strategists will likely not co-
operate against any strategist, acting as ALLD players.
DISC and ALLD players (which constitute a majority
acting as a unique strategy) will invade ALLC and will
coexist as defectors.
• Stern Judging: In this rule, DISC players will posi-
tively evaluate CC and DD actions. For low values of
H0, at early stages (ρc ∼ ρd ∼ ρi), any strategist will
have in his memory, on average, a fraction µSJ of ac-
tions belonging to the set {CC,DD} such that µSJ >H0,
and therefore will be positively evaluated by DISC play-
ers. Thus, DISC players will likely cooperate when
facing any strategist, behaving as ALLC players. Un-
like the previous Shunning case, where ALLD players
obtained benefit only from ALLC, now they get dona-
tions both from ALLC and DISC players, thus having
a higher relative payoff and resulting in an invasion of
ALLD over the rest of strategies. Only for very high
values of benefit (in Fig. 1-2, b & 9) DISC players
can resist invasion by ALLD; actually, this is the only
region of parameters that allows cooperation. On the
other hand, for high values of intolerance H0, and at
early stages, any strategist will have, on average, a frac-
tion µSJ of actions belonging to the set {CC,DD} in his
memory such that µSJ < H0, and therefore will be neg-
atively evaluated by DISC players. However, although
DISC players tend to defect against any strategist, they
have a non-zero probability of cooperating when facing
any player (either ALLC, ALLD, or DISC), resulting
in a lower accumulated payoff than that of ALLD play-
ers. Therefore, DISC players will get the higher accu-
mulated payoff, which drives to an invasion of ALLD
strategy over ALLC and DISC.
• Image Scoring: Here, DISC players will positively
evaluate CC and CD actions and therefore will cooper-
ate against ALLC but not against ALLD players. For
low values of intolerance H0, at early stages, DISC
players will have, on average, a fraction µIS of actions
cooperative actions (CC or CD) in their memory such
that µIS > H0, and therefore will be positively evalu-
ated by other DISC players. Thus, DISCs will likely
cooperate when facing DISC and ALLC players. This
is the same situation than that corresponding to the pre-
vious Shuning - low H0 case: ALLC and DISC play-
ers can form cooperative clusters for high enough b, in-
vading ALLD strategy. Without ALLD players, ALLC
and DISC will coexist as cooperators. On the other
hand, for high values of intolerance H0, at early stages,
DISC players will have, on average, a fraction 1− µIS
of non-cooperative actions in their memory such that
µIS < H0, and therefore will likely be negatively evalu-
ated by other DISC players. Each strategist will coop-
erate against a different set of strategies: ALLC against
any strategist, DISC against ALLC ones, and ALLD
against no strategist. This results in a three-strategies
scenario where the higher payoff corresponds to ALLD
players, who will invade ALLC and ALLD.
• Simple Standing: This rule is the most tolerant: the
only negatively evaluated action is defecting against a
cooperator. Counterintuitively, while high values of in-
tolerance H0 promote cooperation, low values drive to
non-cooperative states. Here, DISC players will posi-
tively evaluate CC, CD and DD actions. As the avail-
able actions for ALLC players are {CC,CD}, and those
for DISC ones are {CC,CD,DD}, DISC strategists will
always cooperate against any ALLC or DISC player.
For low values of H0, at early stages, ALLD players
will have, on average, a fraction µSS of DD actions in
their memory such that µSS > H0, and therefore will
be positively evaluated by DISC strategists. This is the
same situation than that corresponding to the previous
Stern Judging - low H0 case: DISC players will behave
as ALLC players. ALLD players will obtain the higher
accumulated payoff, resulting in an invasion of ALLD
over the rest of strategies. Only for very high values
of b, DISC players can resist invasion by ALLD. As
H0 increases, µSS−H0 decreases, moving towards the
following scenario: for high values of intolerance H0,
ALLD players will have, on average, a fraction µSS of
DD actions at the early stages such that µSS < H0, and
therefore will be negatively evaluated by DISC play-
ers. Thus, DISC players will cooperate when facing
DISC and ALLC, but very unlikely when facing ALLD
players. As ALLC strategists will cooperate against any
player, ALLC and DISC players can form cooperative
clusters for high enough b, invading ALLD strategists
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FIG. 2. Fraction of unconditional cooperators (ALLC), uncondi-
tional defectors (ALLD) and discriminators (DISC) at the stationary
state as a function of the benefit b and intolerance H0 for four differ-
ent second-order assessment rules. From left to right, each column
corresponds to a different rule: Shunning (column I), Stern Judging
(II), Image Scoring (III) and Simple Standing (IV). Top (resp., cen-
ter, bottom) row panels display the fraction of ALLC (resp., ALLD,
DISC) strategists. All results are averaged over 20 independent runs.
Other parameters are N = 2500, c = 1, w = 0.165, h = 50, M = 5,
and K = 1. See the text for further details.
FIG. 3. Evolution of strategies for the Shunning Rule. The snap-
shots show the spatial distribution of three different strategists on the
square lattice in a representative realization in which DISC strategists
follow the Shunning Rule. From panel (a) to panel (h), we record the
distribution of ALLC (Yellow dots), ALLD (Gray donts) and DISC
(Blue dots), with each panel corresponding to a different time frame t
(generation). For this realization, we have taken H0 = 0.2 and b = 9.
Other parameters are N = 2500, c = 1, w = 0.165, h = 50, M = 5,
and K = 1.
who only receive donations from ALLC. In the absence
of ALLD players, ALLC and DISC strategists will be-
have alike and will coexist.
FIG. 4. Evolution of strategies under the Shunning Rule. From
panel (a) to panel (h), we record the distribution of ALLC (Yellow
dots), ALLD (Gray) and DISC (Blue). Each panel corresponds to
a different time frame t (generation). In this characteristic simula-
tion, H0 = 0.9 and b = 4. Other parameters are N = 2500, c = 1,
w = 0.165, h = 50, M = 5, and K = 1.
B. Spatial patterns
In this subsection, we analyze the strategies evolution
through characteristic snapshots. Taking the Shunning Rule as
an example, Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 display the strategies distribu-
tion on the square lattice at different generations (t) to scruti-
nize the evolutionary process, for a low intolerance (H0 = 0.2)
in Fig. 3 and large (H0 = 0.9) in Fig. 4. As mentioned above,
for low values of H0, ALLC and DISC players are more eas-
ily to be positively evaluated: DISC strategists will cooper-
ate when facing DISC and ALLC players, allowing the for-
mation of cooperative clusters. In Fig. 3, it is shown that
ALLD strategists (gray dots) are gradually invaded by ALLC
and DISC ones, and they disappear after around 100 genera-
tions. Even if we reduce the benefit of the recipient (say, b = 2
or 3), similar patterns are still observed (although they are not
shown here for the sake of shortness). However, when H0 is
large enough (e.g., H0 & 0.5), ALLC and DISC players are of-
ten negatively evaluated, which leads DISCs to act as ALLD
strategists. Thus, for largue H0, ALLD and DISC strategies
are equivalent and invade ALLC. This behavior is shown in
Fig. 4, where gray (ALLD) and blue (DISC) dots dominate
the whole population just after 10 generations.
Similarly, the Image Scoring Rule also creates the coexis-
tence between ALLC and DISC ones for low values of the
intolerance H0, and even this case appears for larger H0 when
compared to the Shunning Rule (the corresponding character-
istic snapshots are not shown here for the sake of brevity).
Conversely, for high intolerance H0, as mentioned above,
DISC players cooperate when facing ALLC but not DISC
ones. Thus, ALLD players obtain the higher benefit and dom-
inate the whole population. This evolutionary process is il-
lustrated in Fig. 5, where the simulation setup is identical to
that of Fig. 4 except that here applies the Image Scoring Rule.
The same approach can be used to characterize the competi-
tion among three strategies under Stern Judging and Simple
Standing rules (not shown here for conciseness).
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FIG. 5. Time evolution of three different strategies under the Image
Scoring Rule. From panel (a) to panel (h), we record the distribution
of ALLC (Yellow dots), ALLD (Gray) and DISC (Blue dots), with
each panel corresponding to a different time frame. In this character-
istic realizations, we have taken H0 = 0.9 and b = 4. Other parame-
ters are N = 2500, c = 1, w = 0.165, h = 50, M = 5, and K = 1.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we combine four typical second-order assess-
ment rules with the memory effect to explore the evolution
of cooperation in the spatial donation game. To this end, the
reputation evaluation takes into account the last M actions of
the agents. We discuss the impact of four assessment rules –
namely Shunning, Stern Judging, Image Scoring, and Simple
Standing– on the level of cooperation among the population.
It is found that the assessment rule plays a non-trivial role in
the evolution of cooperation.
In our model, the interplay between any pair of players can
be characterized as a Donation Game, where a player is cho-
sen as a donor and the other one as a recipient. If the donor
contributes by paying a cost c, the recipient will get a benefit
b > c; otherwise, both will get nothing. We implement two
dynamics, one in which strategies do not take into account
neighbors’ payoffs but their reputation, modulated by an in-
tolerance parameter, and another evolutionary dynamic that
takes place at a larger time scale.
We have studied the model through a mean-field approxi-
mation, finding that the role of intolerance varies according
to the assessment rule: while under Shunning, Stern Judg-
ing and Image Scoring rules intolerance hinders cooperation,
it counterintuitively promotes it under Simple Standing rule.
Moreover, it is shown that Stern Judging rule, despite being a
positive rule (positively evaluates more actions than the Shun-
ning Rule), is the one that shows, by far, the lowest values of
cooperation. We have performed extensive simulations that
confirm these findings.
Furthermore, there are several other parameters (e.g., noise
parameter K and memory length M) that deserve considera-
tion in future research. As K increases, the strategy adoption
uncertainty is also increased, but the level of cooperation can
still be qualitatively kept unchanged in the current setup. With
regard to the impact of memory length or weight, we only
adopt the parameter values (M = 5 and w = 0.165) in Ref.40,
but it may deserve further discussion in the future. Mean-
while, observation or reputation evaluation errors may take
place during the decision of donation, which is also worth be-
ing further investigated in future studies. Another potential
direction could be conducted to explore the impact of second-
order assessment rules in heterogeneous networks, such as
small-world45 and scale-free46 networks.
Taking together, based on previous experimental findings
on human behavior, we present a novel second-order evalua-
tion model with memory effect to investigate the evolution of
cooperation in the spatial donation game. These results may
help to understand the cooperative behavior under the indirect
reciprocity and reputation mechanisms.
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